On method-specific record linkage for risk assessment by Nin Guerrero, Jordi et al.
 WP.7 
ENGLISH ONLY 
 
UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL COMMISSION and 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE 
CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN STATISTICIANS 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EUROSTAT) 
 
Joint UNECE/Eurostat work session on statistical data confidentiality 
(Manchester, United Kingdom, 17-19 December 2007) 
 
Topic (i): Microdata  
 
 
 
 
ON METHOD-SPECIFIC RECORD LINKAGE FOR RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
Invited Paper 
 
  
Prepared by Jordi Nin, Javier Herranz and Vicenç Torra, Artificial Intelligence Research Institute and 
Spanish National Research Council, Spain 
 
 
On method-specific record linkage for risk
assessment
Jordi Nin, Javier Herranz and Vicenc¸ Torra
IIIA, Artificial Intelligence Research Institute
CSIC, Spanish National Research Council
Campus UAB s/n
08193 Bellaterra (Catalonia, Spain)
{jnin,jherranz,vtorra}@iiia.csic.es
Abstract. Nowadays, the need for privacy motivates the use of methods that permit us to
protect a microdata file both minimizing the disclosure risk and preserving the statistical
utility.
Nevertheless, research is usually focused on how data utility is preserved, and much
less research effort is dedicated to the study of the tools that an intruder might use to
compromise the privacy of the data or, in other words, to increase the disclosure risk.
Record linkage is a standard mechanism used to measure the disclosure risk of a micro-
data protection method. In this paper we present some improvements for the (standard)
distance based record linkage. In particular, we test our improvements to evaluate the
disclosure risk of rank swapping, which is higher than what was believed up to now. We
will also present the results of the application of this approach to microaggregation.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, statistical agencies publish confidential microdata files in the Internet.
This data can be accessible for a variety of users, as decision makers, politicians,
researchers or general public. However, such publication has to fulfill laws and
regulations to preserve the privacy of the respondents.
A good statistical practice is that the released data include a full description of
the data as well as the anonymization criteria that has been applied. For instance, all
available microdata files in the EUROSTAT web page [12] include a text description
explaining all the anonymization criteria applied to the confidential data.
The main goal of data protection methods [1], is to minimize both the disclosure
risk (DR) and the information loss (IL) of the protected released microdata. Disclo-
sure risk measures the capacity of an intruder to obtain some sensitive information
about the original dataset from the protected one, and information loss measures
the reduction of the statistical utility of the protected microdata with respect to the
original one.
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Information loss is deeply studied in many works [2, 6, 14], and it is out of the
scope of this paper. Although, we will use in our experiments the measures defined
in [7] to compare several protection methods.
In this paper, we focus in the way of computing the disclosure risk. Many
works [6, 20] use record linkage methods [18, 19] for this purpose. Such methods are
widely used in the scenario where an intruder has a compete access to the protected
data set, whereas he knows some records of the original data set obtained from other
data sources (publicly available or not). The aim of the intruder is to use record
linkage to link his original records with the corresponding protected records released
by the statistical agency. Obviously, the more records are correctly linked, the more
disclosure risk has the employed protection method. Some examples of standard
record linkage methods are distance based ones and probabilistic ones.
As we have said before, a good practice for statistical agencies is to give a com-
plete description of the anonymization process, therefore, the intruder has a valuable
information about how protected data is obtained. For this reason, the common as-
sumption that a real intruder will use a standard record linkage method is quite
unrealistic.
Many protection methods like rank swapping [16] or univariate microaggrega-
tion [8], protect the data using only local information, so that information loss is
kept low. For instance, rank swapping has a parameter which limits the swap in-
terval, or univariate microaggregation build the clusters with the k nearest values
when the original data is sorted.
In this paper, we present an ad-hoc record linkage method called Location Record
Linkage (L-RL). Our method exploits such limitations (i.e. protection is made
locally). Using this knowledge, the intruder can limit the records where the record
linkage method is applied, decreasing in this way the probability of finding incorrect
links. As a result there is an increase on the number of correct links, and, therefore,
an increment in the disclosure risk of such protection methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the three data
protection methods (rank swapping, univariate and multivariate microaggregation)
where we have tested the new ad-hoc record linkage technique. Then we explain in
Section 3 the basic concepts related to data protection, disclosure risk, information
loss and the standard definition of score. a description of the new record linkage
method. In Section 4 we describe the Location Record Linkage (L-RL) technique, we
define a new score which takes into account L-RL, and we test L-RL with the above-
mentioned protection methods. Finally, in Section 5, we draw some conclusions and
present some future work.
2
2 A Review of Protection Methods
2.1 Rank Swapping
Rank swapping is a widely used microdata protection method, which was originally
described [16] only for ordinal attributes. However, in the comparisons made in
[7], rank swapping was ranked among the best microdata protection methods for
numerical attributes.
Rank swapping with parameter p and with respect to an attribute attrj (i.e., the
j-th column of the original dataset X) can be defined as follows: first, the records
of X are sorted in increasing order of the values xij of the considered attribute
attrj . For simplicity, assume that the records are already sorted, that is xij ≤ xℓj
for all 1 ≤ i < ℓ ≤ n. Then, each value xij is swapped with another value xℓj,
randomly and uniformly chosen in the set of still unswapped values in the limited
range i < ℓ ≤ i + p. Finally, the sorting step is undone. When rank swapping is
applied to a dataset, the algorithm explained above is run for each attribute to be
protected, in a sequential way.
2.2 Univariate Microaggregation
Another widely used microdata protection method is microaggregation. Given a
data set of a attributes, microaggregation builds small clusters of at least k elements
and replaces each original value by the centroid of the cluster to which the element
belongs.
A few different approaches exist for microaggregation. The simplest one is when
each attribute is protected independently. This corresponds to univariate microag-
gregation. At present, a few optimal univariate microaggregation algorithms have
been developed. A good example is [13], where the authors implement an opti-
mal univariate microaggregation using graph operations over a graph built from the
confidential data.
2.3 MDAV Microaggregation
The MDAV (Maximum Distance to Average Vector) algorithm [15] is an heuristic
algorithm for multivariate microaggregation. MDAV is an iterative algorithm; at
each step, it computes first the average record of a set of records and then builds a
cluster with the farthest k records of this average record. Then, in the same step,
another cluster is built with the farthest k records from the centroid of the new built
cluster. Then, all the records of these two clusters are removed, and the process is
repeated until all original values are protected.
3 Disclosure Risk Scenario
The main objective of a protection method is to anonymize a data set. A data set
can be viewed as a file containing a number of records, where each record contains a
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Figure 1: Re-identification scenario.
set of attributes describing an individual. The attributes in the original data set can
be classified into two different categories, depending on their capability to identify
individuals, as follows:
• Identifiers. They can be used to identify the individual unambiguously. A
typical example of identifier is the passport number.
• Quasi-identifiers. They cannot identify a single individual when used alone.
However, when they are combined with others quasi-identifiers attributes, they
can uniquely identify an individual. Among the quasi-identifier attributes,
we can distinguish between confidential and non-confidential, depending on
whether they contain confidential information. An example of non-confidential
quasi-identifier attribute is the postal code, while a confidential quasi-identifier
is the salary.
When a data set is protected, identifiers are removed or encrypted to prevent
an intruder to re-identify individuals easily. Typically, the remaining attributes are
released, some of them protected. In this paper, we assume that non-confidential
attributes are protected, while confidential attributes are not. This allows third
parties to have precise information on confidential data without revealing to whom
that confidential data belongs to.
In this scenario, as shown in Figure 1, an intruder might try to re-identify in-
dividuals by obtaining the non-confidential quasi-identifiers (Y ) together with the
identifiers (Id) from other data sources. Then, applying record linkage between the
protected attributes (Y ′) and the same attributes obtained from other data sources
(Y ), the intruder might be able to re-identify a percentage of the protected individ-
uals together with their confidential data (X). This is what protection methods try
to prevent.
In general, the avoidance of all risk is not possible as this usually implies no
information. Instead, we have to find a good trade off between information loss and
disclosure risk. The score, presented in [6], was defined to measure this trade off
in terms of information loss and disclosure risk measures. We define such measures
below.
We will use these measures in our experiments as defined in [7].
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• Information Loss (IL). Let X and X ′ be matrices representing the original
and the protected data set, respectively. Let V and R be the covariance
matrix and the correlation matrix of X, respectively; let X be the vector of
variable averages for X and let S be the diagonal of V . Define V ′, R′,X
′
, and
S ′ analogously from X ′. The information loss is computed by averaging the
mean variations of X−X ′,V −V ′,S−S ′, and the mean absolute error of R−R′
and multiplying the resulting average by 100.
• Disclosure Risk (DR). The three different methods were presented in [18]
to evaluate this risk: (i) Distance Linkage Disclosure risk (DLD), which is the
average percentage of linked records using distance based record linkage, (ii)
Probabilistic Linkage Disclosure risk (PLD), which is the average percentage
of linked records using probabilistic based record linkage and (iii) Interval
Disclosure risk (ID) which is the average percentage of original values falling
into the intervals around their corresponding masked values. The three values
are computed over the number of attributes that the intruder is assumed to
know that, in our case, ranges from one to half of the attributes. The DR is
a weighted mean that gives half weights to ID and the other half to linkage
disclosure risk. That is:
DR = 0.5 ID + 0.5 [
DLD + PLD
2
]
• Score: The final score is defined as the arithmetic sum of IL and DR, therefore
score = 0.5 IL+ 0.5DR
4 Location Record Linkage
As we stated in Section 1, standard record linkage methods underestimate the real
disclosure risk in the real world. Here, we consider a new protection method to
be used when the intruder knows that only a subset of the protected records are
eligible for being linked with the original one. We will call this method location
record linkage (L-RL for short).
The rationale of our approach is intuitive: protection methods perturbate the
original values in a controlled and predictive way to keep information loss as low
as possible. For instance, for a given attribute, standard rank swapping swaps one
original value with one of the p following values in the sorted table. Then, if the
intruder knows all protected attributes (this is our case), he only needs to compare
the original record xi that he wants to link with 2p records in the protected data set
(note that a protected value can be either the source or the destination in the swap
process). The same problem happens with univariate microaggregation, where, if
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original data is sorted, clusters are non-overlaped and the values of each cluster are
contiguous.
Obviously, if more than one attribute are known, it is possible to repeat the
process for each attribute. Formally, if the original record xi = (xi1, . . . , xic) has c
attributes attr1, . . . , attrc, then, the matching protected record x
′
ℓ will necessarily
satisfy the condition
x′ℓ ∈ ∩1≤j≤cB(xij),
where B(xij contains all the protected records whose j-th attribute is one of the 2p
candidates to have been swapped with xij. That is, the search of the protected record
is reduced to an intersection of the sets of possible protected records. Of course,
the more attributes are considered, the less records will be in this intersection,
and, therefore, the probability of finding the correct record linkage will increase.
However, this is not the main concern, because for some combination of the protected
attributes, the intersection gives a unique record: the intruder can be sure that this
is the protected record which matches with the considered original record. This is so,
because this linkage method does not introduce error probabilities. So, the method
guarantees to the intruder that the link is correct.
4.1 Experiments
We have considered two different data sets in our experiments. The first one, called
Census, has been extracted using the Data Extraction System (DES) from the U. S.
Census Bureau [5]. This dataset contains 1080 records consisting of 13 attributes.
The second one, called EIA, was extracted from the U.S. Energy Information Au-
thority [11]. It contains 4092 records consisting of 10 attributes.
As we are interested in studying the effects of the L-RL, we have computed two
different indicators:
Number of linkages. We study the number of correct links that L-RL is able to
find using different sets of attributes. We will assume that the intruder knows
all the protected records and he has partial knowledge of the attributes.
Score computation. We compute the standard score and a new variant of it
which takes into account the L-RL method. Formally, we define these two
score as
• Score1. The standard score is computed as presented in Section 3. That
is
score = 0.5 IL+ 0.125DLD + 0.125PLD + 0.25 ID
• Score2. Our variant of the score is defined by the following expression
that includes the standard measures as well as the new L-RL (we use
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rs 2 rs 4 rs 6 rs 8 rs 10 rs 12 rs 14 rs 16 rs 18 rs 20
1 38.4 18.0 16.8 10.8 10.8 6.4 6.8 5.2 4.0 4.0
2 497.0 130.2 54.2 29.2 21.8 15.4 13.0 10.4 7.0 6.0
3 1034.2 761.2 420.6 197.2 99.0 60.2 45.2 32.4 28.8 24.2
4 1071.8 959.6 694.2 378.6 199.4 107.2 71.6 58.0 49.4 39.6
5 1076.8 1042.0 925.2 711.6 463.2 281.4 195.0 165.6 131.6 121.2
6 1079 .0 1063.2 1001.6 879.2 681.0 484.2 413.0 340.4 293.6 287.4
7 1079.2 1064.2 1018.6 913.8 733.0 547.4 475.4 432.4 408.6 339.2
8 1079.2 1077.6 1071.8 1042.6 972.0 861.6 701.6 528.6 472.4 386.4
9 1079.6 1077.6 1071.4 1065.6 1036.6 988.8 888.0 766.6 602.0 466.0
10 1079.6 1078.2 1072.1 1066.6 1039.2 996.6 930.8 824.8 677.4 544.0
11 1079.6 1079.1 1073.4 1069.2 1039.4 1001.0 939.4 846.8 706.2 574.0
12 1079.6 1079.1 1073.4 1069.6 1041.2 1002.0 942.0 853.4 726.4 593.8
13 1079.6 1079.1 1076.7 1070.3 1044.8 1004.4 944.2 871.0 745.6 615.4
Table 1: Number of correctly linked records when L-RL is applied to Census data
set, protected with rank swapping. The first column shows the number of known
attributes.
LLD to denote Location Linkage Disclosure risk) presented in Section 4.
That is,
score = 0.5 IL+ 0.25 (
DLD + PLD + LLD
3
) + 0.25 ID
4.1.1 Rank Swapping
In Tables 1 and 2 we can observe detailed results about the number of correct
links obtained by L-RL using different sets of attributes on data protected using
rank swapping. It is easy to observe that the more attributes are known by the
intruder, the more records are linked. Note that, for the five less protected data
sets from Census, an intruder links more than 70% of the records when only half
of the attributes are known. Another interesting result with the Census data set is
that the intruder is always able to link more than 50% of the records if he knows all
the attributes. Similar results are obtained for the EIA data set. For the three less
protected datasets, the intruder is able to link more than 50% of records when all
the attributes are known.
Tables 3 (Census data set) and 4 (EIA data set) present score1 and score2, as
well as the original values of their components before their aggregation. We can
observe that the largest disclosure risk measure, for all cases, is LLD. Therefore, it
is clear that the L-RL method increases the risk with respect to standard ones for
rank swapping.
4.1.2 Univariate Microaggregation
In Table 5 we can observe detailed results about the number of correct links ob-
tained by L-RL using different sets of attributes for data protected using univariate
microaggregation. The results show clearly that the intruder is able to link almost
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rs 2 rs 4 rs 6 rs 8 rs 10 rs 12 rs 14 rs 16 rs 18 rs 20
1 70.3 46.1 43.6 42.4 40.0 37.6 37.6 35.1 37.5 36.3
2 378.4 183.4 145.1 139.8 135.7 135.4 134.6 133.2 133.0 132.3
3 2174.8 338.8 284.1 246.8 236.1 229.1 226.1 224.7 224.3 223.5
4 2827.1 557.0 380.5 327.6 310.2 301.7 298.3 296.0 294.7 294.9
5 3402.9 1441.3 720.9 496.1 423.7 398.7 384.1 373.0 374.0 367.7
6 3582.9 1859.4 856.3 512.4 400.3 415.9 397.0 380.2 378.8 371.3
7 3699.8 2420.6 1325.3 709.6 431.4 423.9 410.1 393.1 424.5 391.6
8 3778.6 2699.0 1631.7 947.3 572.8 448.8 458.3 411.5 445.6 401.3
9 3810.1 2862.2 1808.5 1081.8 654.6 492.2 479.4 420.9 451.9 409.3
10 3831.5 2996.8 1986.3 1221.5 741.5 539.2 507.9 432.6 455.4 411.8
Table 2: Number of correctly linked records when L-RL is applied to EIA dataset,
protected with standard rank swapping. The first column shows the number of
known attributes.
all the records using only a few attributes. This happens for both data sets. It is
clear that univariate microaggregation has a high disclosure risk, greater than the
one of rank swapping.
Tables 7 and 8 present, in the same way than in the rank swapping example,
score1 and score2, as well as, their components. We can observe that the largest dis-
closure risk measure is LLD in all cases. Therefore, it is clear that the L-RL method
increases the risk with respect to standard ones for univariate microaggregation.
4.1.3 Multivariate Microaggregation
Table 9 presents the number of correct links obtained by L-RL using different sets
of attributes for data protected using MDAV multivariate microaggregation. As we
can observe in the table, the more groups of attributes are known, the less records
are linked. This is due that to the fact that MDAV does not present the same
locality problem than univariate microaggregation and rank swapping. In other
words, not all the original records are assigned to the cluster represented by the
nearest centroid. I.e., some records might be assigned to the second or third nearest
cluster. Therefore, L-RL is unsuitable for MDAV. This effect is also illustrated in
Tables 10 and 11, where LLD is the lowest disclosure risk value, therefore score2 is
lower than score1 and LLD should not be used for the evaluation of the disclosure
risk for MDAV.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a new type of record linkage designed to exploit
the limitations of some protection methods. We have shown that this new method
obtains a more accurate disclosure risk evaluation for rank swapping and univariate
microaggregation.
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IL LLD DLD PLD ID Score1 Score2
rs 2 3.89 77.73 73.52 71.28 93.98 43.54 43.98
rs 4 6.54 66.65 58.40 42.92 83.09 36.71 38.04
rs 6 10.57 54.65 43.76 22.49 72.12 31.60 33.39
rs 8 16.54 41.28 32.13 11.74 62.11 29.28 30.89
rs 10 20.18 29.21 23.64 6.03 53.28 27.12 28.32
rs 12 23.46 19.87 18.96 3.46 47.17 26.33 27.05
rs 14 28.93 16.14 15.63 2.06 43.39 27.52 28.13
rs 16 35.16 13.81 13.59 1.29 40.78 29.64 30.17
rs 18 32.52 12.21 11.50 0.83 38.90 27.53 28.03
rs 20 35.12 10.88 10.87 0.59 37.33 28.33 28.75
Table 3: Score calculation for rank swapping using the Census data set. IL stands
for Information Loss, LLD stands for Location Linkage Disclosure, DLD stands for
Distance Linkage Disclosure, PLD stands for Probability Linkage Disclosure, ID
stands for Interval Disclosure, Score1 is the score computed only using DLD and
PLD and Score2 is the score computed taking into account LLD results.
IL LLD DLD PLD ID Score1 Score2
rs 2 4.24 43.27 21.71 16.85 93.10 30.22 32.21
rs 4 9.67 12.54 10.61 4.79 82.09 27.28 27.69
rs 6 14.63 7.69 7.40 2.03 72.21 26.55 26.79
rs 8 18.71 6.12 5.98 1.12 63.90 26.22 26.43
rs 10 22.87 5.60 5.19 0.69 57.09 26.44 26.66
rs 12 26.60 5.39 4.87 0.51 51.64 26.88 27.11
rs 14 29.42 5.28 4.55 0.32 47.49 27.19 27.43
rs 16 32.38 5.19 4.54 0.23 44.19 27.83 28.07
rs 18 34.22 5.20 4.54 0.22 41.42 28.06 28.30
rs 20 36.27 5.15 4.36 0.18 38.97 28.45 28.69
Table 4: Score calculation for rank swapping using the EIA data set.
We have also presented some experiments using MDAV microaggregation that
prove that in some sense MDAV is immune to the location problem described in this
paper.
As future work, we plan to study the disclosure risk of MDAV and other protec-
tion methods using other ad-hoc, specific, record linkage methods.
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Census EIA
k 2 Vars 3 Vars 4 Vars 5 Vars 2 Vars 3 Vars 4 Vars 5 Vars
10 1032 1079 1080 1080 3430 3923 3947 4035
20 892 1070 1077 1079 2609 3780 3872 3980
30 704 1054 1072 1078 1931 3599 3751 3900
40 531 1021 1065 1076 1388 3347 3621 3806
50 379 989 1054 1069 1012 3074 3427 3703
Table 5: Number of correctly linked records when L-RL is applied to Census data
set, protected with univariate microaggregation.
Table 6: Score optimal univariate microaggregation using the Census data set
k IL LLD DLD PLD ID Score1 Score2
10 1.15 98.87 86.28 86.31 98.36 46.74 47.79
20 2.85 95.32 83.43 83.47 93.43 45.64 46.63
30 3.71 90.46 80.36 80.21 88.41 44.03 44.88
40 4.71 85.49 77.00 76.57 83.69 42.47 43.20
50 5.66 80.81 73.94 73.56 79.41 41.12 41.71
Table 7: Score calculation for optimal univariate microaggregation using the Census
data set.
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